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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE THE THREE 
FINDINGS NECESSARY TO AWARD ATTORNEY'S 
FEES UNDER SEC. 78-27-56 U.C.A. 1953 
In its brief Appellants set forth in some detail 
on pages 9-12 the teachings of Cady v. Johnson, 671 P2d 149 
(Utah, 1983) that there must be three "distinct findings11 
to sustain an award of attorney's fees under the subject 
statute. Respondents do not take issue with Appellants 
reading of Cady. To the contrary they state "three 
conditions must be met before a court may impose attorneyfs 
fees under Sec. 78-27-56" p. 21. They then set forth the 
same findings referred to above. In the next nine pages 
respondents set forth factors which they claim would 
sustain such findings but they never claim that any such 
findings were made by the trial court. Obviously no such 
findings were made as there is only one "finding" set forth 
by the trial court which related to Sec. 78-27-56 (1) and 
that related solely to the reasonableness of the amount of 
the award (R. 427). The version of the applicable finding 
set forth in respondents1 brief (No. 1 on p. 7), which is 
not the same wording as the courtfs, only finds that an 
award of $10,000.00 in bad faith attorney's fee were made 
against plaintiff. The court's finding consisted of only 
16 words in addition to the citation and there are only 12 
words including three articles in respondents' version of 
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that finding. Neither version could possibly set forth all 
three of the essential findings. 
Without waiving the defects as to the other two 
findings, Appellants will canvas the basis for any findings 
that Plaintiff !s claims were lfwithout merit11 (lfB" on p. 
21-24 of Respondents1 brief). 
Respondents first contend that "the defendants 
unrebutted evidence at trial fully supports the finding 
that there was a complete lack of merit to plaintiff's 
claims.11 This ipse dixit statement is simply not so as no 
one so testified and there was no such finding made. 
What defendants1 witnesses testified to in effect 
was that the extent of injuries could not have been as 
great a^s they believed plaintiff was claiming. If one is 
claiming injuries which justify an award of $50,000.00 or 
more obviously the accident and injuries must be much more 
severe than if the injuries claimed were the basis of a 
claim for $5,000.00. The fact that defendants' witnesses 
testify that in their opinion the injuries would not 
support the former (which they erroneously believed was 
plaintiff's claim) does not mean that those injuries do not 
support the later or any claim less than that down to 
nothing. Even if the injuries were only sufficient to 
support nominal damages the testimony with respect to such 
injuries would not be wholly without merit. Henry Ford 
once won a libel suit and a jury verdict of $1.00 (or was 
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it $0.01?). The jury obviously did not think the libel 
harmed him but can it be said that his claim was "without 
merit'1? If evidence only sufficient to sustain nominal 
damages created liability for bad faith attorney's fees 
then the statute creating such liability should clearly so 
state. Otherwise an affirmance of this award amounts to 
judicial amendment of that statute. "Without merit11 surely 
excludes a claim for nominal damages as well as substantial 
damages. 
Respondents do not contend in their brief on this 
point that Dr. Luers and Dr. Fogg testified that the bus 
accident did not cause any injuries but only that the bus 
accident did not cause the injuries "that plaintiff 
claimed" (i.e., major injuries). Thus their testimony is 
not proof that plaintiff's claim was "without merit" in 
their opinion but only that it merited only a minor claim 
consideration or nominal damages, hence a matter of 
relativity. 
As for plaintiff's "dramatic change of position" 
at the conclusion of the case the respondents provide no 
basis for comparison and do not state what the ending 
position is compared with. With the pleadings that started 
the case? With the opening statement? With what? Rather 
than condemning plaintiff tor his counsel's realistic 
assessment at the conclusion of the case such candor should 
be acknowledged and encouraged. Certainly that 
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acknowledgment that the evidence did not justify an award 
for major damages is not a concession that the evidence 
does not justify an award for minor or minimal injuries. 
Appellants object to respondents supporting their 
position by going outside the record in this case in 
quoting from a deposition testimony that was not introduced 
into evidence in the trial itself (note No, 9 on p. 23) and 
more critically the analysis of plaintiff's deposition 
testimony on p. 26 which was not before the judge and jury 
at the trial. 
If plaintifffs claim had some merit, however 
slight, to support the claim he finally made in this case, 
then his claim was not without merit. The objective proof 
of that minimal amount of merit is found in the fact that 
the jury found the defendant driver was negligent in 
connection with the rear-end accident involved in this case 
(R. 321) and the testimony of respondents1 expert, Dr. 
Fogg, who testifies that in his opinion plaintiff suffered 
minimal injuries as a result of the accident in question 
(R. 509, p. 230, 231). Had the jury rendered a verdict for 
a small sum based on that evidence it would surely have 
withstood any appellate claim that the verdict was not 
supported by the evidence. 
It is significant that respondents have not 
challenged the contention of appellant as to the meaning of 
"without merit11 as being "frivolous11 which was defined in 
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Cady v. Johnson, 671 P2d 149 (Utah, 1983) as being "of 
little weight or importance, having no basis in law or 
fact" nor do they deny that the resources they used in 
defending this cause shows that they themselves considered 
the claims in question to be one of great importance. 
If plaintifffs claims were totally devoid of merit 
the trial court should have directed a verdict in favor of 
defendants at the conclusion of the case. Instead he took 
defendants1 motion for dismissal under advisement and 
allowed the case to proceed to a jury verdict after 
instruction, argument and deliberation which extended the 
trial to the next day and consumed half of a day in the 
process (R. 509, p. 252). 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPLYING 
THAT HANSEN DID NOT READ A DOCUMENT 
OR SIGNED IT WITHOUT A REASONABLE 
INQUIRY AS TO ITS MERITS IN FACT 
AND LAW 
Respondents contend (p. 30) that "Hansen did 
nothing more than request a copy of the investigating 
officerfs report of the earlier accident" (R. 378). This 
simply is not true. The fact is that Hansen confronted 
client with his opinion that it was obvious the truck had 
been is a prior accident (R. 392-414). This is proof 
positive that he did not "chose to ignore the significance 
of the photographs of the accidents" (p. 30). He learned 
thereby that the damages were under $300.00 for the first 
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accident and over $900.00 for the second accident, facts 
which are undisputed in the evidence (Addendum i and ii) 
and which significant facts are totally ignored in 
respondents1 brief despite their being emphasized in 
appellants1 Brief (see p. 2, last paragraph and p. 3; also 
p. 16, last paragraph). 
Respondents contend that Hansen's investigation 
was not a reasonable one because he should have examined 
the medical records and radiographs of his client's experts 
as they would have "conclusively established the bad faith 
and lack of merit in his client's claims" (p« 31). This is 
ridiculous. Hansen has no competence to evaluate medical 
evidence. Surely an objection would be properly sustained 
if he ever ventured to express any medical opinion and 
especially one as technical as the one just referred to. 
Respondents claim that the trial court determined 
that "Hansen failed to meet the 'reasonable inquiry' 
standard required by Rule 11" (p. 33). This ipse dixit 
assertion has no support in the record. In fact the trial 
court made no express finding regarding any inquiry (R. 
427). On the contrary the trial judge substituted the 
"could or should have sensed" standard for the "reasonable 
inquiry" standard as noted in Appellants' brief at p. 14. 
Nowhere is this addressed in the Respondents' brief. 
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Ill 
THIS APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS OR FOR 
PURPOSES OF DELAY AND THUS NOT 
VIOLATIVE OF RULE 33 OR RULE 40 
It is not true, as asserted by Respondents on page 
34, that appellants "are doing little more than re-arguing 
their case on appeal.11 The fact of the matter is that 
there has never been an argument on these issues before the 
trial court despite appellant's request for such an 
argument (R. 415). 
It is also not true that the trial court made a 
finding that "Hansen failed to make a reasonable inquiry.11 
As to Hansen the finding only stated that he "could or 
should have sensed the nature and lack of merit in the 
case..." (R. 427), a wholly different fault and one not 
embraced within Rule 11 . 
Such disparity between Respondents1 brief and the 
record amply j ustifies that appeal. Additionally the 
factual errors in those brief findings are so flagrant as 
to raise concern as to the care with which they were 
reached, namely (1) the State was never a party to this 
action. Counsel for Respondents represented the Granite 
School District and one of its bus drivers. The fact that 
those same attorneys usually do represent the State does 
not alter their representation in this action and (2) the 
fact that the disclosure meeting of counsel occurred on 
August 9, 1988 (not August 3) -- see Respondents1 Brief, p. 
10. 
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Other sound bases for the appeal are set forth 
under I and II above. 
Respondents erroneously contend that "the record 
in support of these findings is so strong and the grounds 
for this appeal so flimsy" that delay could only be its 
purpose. The record can not support a nonexistent finding, 
however, and the characterization of the appeal weight is 
simply an ipse dixit assertion which makes no attempt to 
connect any evidence in the record with a finding of a 
legally insufficient "reasonable inquiry" required by Rule 
11 • 
By simply ignoring much of the substance of 
appellant!s brief the respondents seek to avoid giving it 
the serious attention it should be given. For instance 
appellant's brief pointed out that the instant case was 
distinguishable from Takip v. Thurber, 739 P2d 1101 (Utah, 
1987) in that there the sanctioned party "testified 
falsely" (p. 12) and respondents1 brief claimed that the 
plaintiff here testified falsely in his deposition before 
trial (p. 26) and ignored the explanation plaintiff made 
concerning that deposition (Appellant's Brief, p. 3) and 
even more importantly ignored the admitted facts that the 
prior accident damages were under $300.00 and the second 
one were over $900.00 (Addendum i and ii). 
Another glaring failure to address the real issues 
in this appeal is the fact that under 1(B) dealing with 
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"without merit" (Respondents' Brief, p. 21) nothing is said 
with respect to these critical factors regarding that issue 
set forth in Appellant's Brief pages 10-12: (1) definition 
of "without merit", (2) no express finding of this fact as 
required by Cady, a case Respondents' rely on, (3) 
Appellant Jeschke's motion for summary judgment, (4) 52 
interrogatories, (5) eight hours of deposition of 
plaintiff, (6) seven hours of deposition of Dr. Burns, (7) 
expert witness fees of $10,000.00, (8) the trial court's 
taking defendants' motion for a directed verdict under 
advisement, all of which should be considered in 
determining whether a case is without merit. 
Respondents also ignored the argument set forth by 
appellant Hansen on page 18 of his brief. This is 
particularly significant because Rule 11 has as its main 
purpose to discourage litigation, not to cause it. 
Finally, it is highly significant that respondents 
made no attempt to rebut Hansen's argument under Point II 
on page 13 that (1) the certification which was allegedly 
in violation of Rule 11 was not specified in the motion, 
(2) that Rule 11 is not invoked by one party giving notice 
of facts to the other, (3) that there is no evidence in the 
record that no inquiry or an inadequate inquiry was made 
with respect to the informal notice in question. 
Certainly an appeal is not frivolous which seeks 
to confine Rule 11 sanctions to certifications which 
violate that rule. 
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Under this point respondents urge this Court to 
impose additional sanctions because "Hansen has further 
misstated and mischaracterized the evidence...11 (regarding 
withdrawal) claiming that the "transcript of the 
on-the-record meeting in the judge's chamber shows that 
Hansen's assertion is false.11 This is clearly a false 
assertion by Ogilvie as an examination of that transcript 
shows no such proof. The transcript itself shows that the 
court and counsel had two oft-the-record discussions on 
that date, one before the recording began (R. 511, p. 18) 
and one during the recording (R. 511, p. 17). Thus the 
only evidence in the record on this point is the affidavit 
of Hansen that such occurred (R. 395, para. 18) although it 
was in error as to its being "on the record". The near 
certainty that no judge would compel an attorney to proceed 
to trial where to do so would violate his ethical standards 
gives rise to an inference in support of that affidavit. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgments appealed from herein should be 
reversed and vacated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of September, 
1990. y^~\ 
Robert B. Hansen 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the 11th day of 
September, 1990, four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT were mailed by the 
undersigned to Edward 0. Ogilvie, Reed M. Stringham, 
Assistant Attorney Generals, 236 State Capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, Attorneys for Respondents. 
Robert B. Hansen 
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ADDENDUM 
Photocopy of R. 508, p. 38 
(testimony regarding truck 
damage from first accident, 
truck damages from second 
accident, one involved in 
this suit) 
A 
Q 
I BELIEVE IT WAS A LITTLE OVER A YEAR. 
AND DURING THAT YEAR'S TIME HAD IT EVER BEEN 
IN AN ACCIDENT WHETHER YOU WERE IN IT OR NOT? 
THE 
A 
Q 
A 
TRUCK 
RIGHT OUT 
OUR WORK 
YES* IT WAS. 
AND CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THAT? 
I WAS AT WORK AT THE FAIRMONT BOWLING ALLEY AND 
WAS PARKED ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE BOWLING ALLEY 
IN FRONT OF THE DOORS. AND I WENT OUT TO--THAT 
TRUCK WAS PARKED DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF IT--AND I 
WENT OUTSIDE TO GET SOME PART OUT OF THE TRUCK AND I NOTICED 
MY TRUCK HAD BEEN PUSHED INTO THE WORK TRUCK AND I LOOKED 
AT IT CLOSER AND IT HAD BEEN HIT AND RUN. 
Q DID YOU GET COMPENSATED FOR THAT? 
A YES, I DID. 
Q HOW MUCH? 
A A LITTLE UNDER $300.00. 
Q DID YOU GET THOSE DAMAGES REPAIRED THEN? 
A SOME OF THEM, YES. 
Q WHAT DID YOU GET REPAIRED? 
A I REPAIRED THE BUMPER. I BELIEVE THAT WAS IT. 
Q HAVE YOU GOTTEN COMPENSATED FOR THE DAMAGE TO 
YOUR VEHICLE IN CONNECTION WITH THIS ACCIDENT? 
A YES, I WAS. 
Q HOW MUCH DID YOU GET? 
A THE ESTIMATE WAS FOR $1,100 BUT I DON'T RECALL, 
38 
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ADDENDUM 
Photocopy of Exhibits 9-D, 10-D 
(truck damages from second 
accident, the one involved in 
this suit) 
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